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From Jacob Champion <>
Subject Re: [users@httpd] explicitly including other ciphers for use with https
Date Tue, 08 Dec 2015 19:15:46 GMT
On 12/07/2015 09:54 PM, William A Rowe Jr wrote:
> On Dec 7, 2015 11:36 PM, "Marat Khalili" <
> <>> wrote:
>  >>
>  >> Everything *after* that handshake, in cleartext, is open for
> inspection or for manipulation
>  >
>  > Are you sure about the manipulation part? Why do you think encryption
> helps here then?
> To turn the question around, what gives you the suggestion that the user
> agent or the httpd server would notice any modification of plaintext
> bytes in transit through a router or other network intermediate?

I would _expect_ that clients using an eNULL ciphersuite would check the 
MAC that is transferred as part of the TLS record. I would further 
expect the MAC to have been computed using a secret that was set up 
during the initial handshake, so that it cannot be faked by an 
intermediary who has been watching the stream. That's what I meant when 
I said that NULL encryption should have (AFAIK) no effect on the authn 
and integrity characteristics of the ciphersuites. It should only affect 
the confidentiality.

But I'm not an expert in TLS -- do you know of a reason that eNULL 
ciphersuites have weaker guarantees on their integrity checks? If so, 
I'd really like to know... This is the second time in a week that 
someone has told me that eNULL ciphers provide effectively no security, 
and up to this point I have believed otherwise.

(As an experiment, I compiled httpd to allow eNULL ciphersuites and 
captured an s_client conversation with dumpcap. Wireshark immediately 
"decrypted" the plaintext data but showed that there was still a MAC 
appended to each record. Modifying a single byte of that data caused 
Wireshark to fail its "decryption" of that record.)


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