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From "Andrew Purtell (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (PHOENIX-4198) Remove the need for users to have access to the Phoenix SYSTEM tables to create tables
Date Wed, 13 Sep 2017 18:48:00 GMT

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4198?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16165100#comment-16165100
] 

Andrew Purtell commented on PHOENIX-4198:
-----------------------------------------

I think Phoenix should use HBase native security features, there is no need to require use
of a third party component like Ranger or Sentry. If Ranger or Sentry offer something compelling,
fine, a user is free to pick them up and use them, but mandating them is IMHO mandating user
lock-in on something external to HBase+Phoenix for what is a core functional concern (protection
of SYSTEM tables). That is the wrong approach. HBase+Phoenix should natively provide protection
of SYSTEM tables as required.

Also, there are already a lot of downstream dependencies for a Phoenix build due to all of
the connector modules, and the cross-product of these already present a challenge to DIY-ers
trying to orchestrate a whole stack for production. 

> Remove the need for users to have access to the Phoenix SYSTEM tables to create tables
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: PHOENIX-4198
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4198
>             Project: Phoenix
>          Issue Type: Bug
>            Reporter: Ankit Singhal
>            Assignee: Ankit Singhal
>              Labels: namespaces
>             Fix For: 4.12.0
>
>         Attachments: PHOENIX-4198.patch
>
>
> Problem statement:-
> A user who doesn't have access to a table should also not be able to modify  Phoenix
Metadata. Currently, every user required to have a write permission to SYSTEM tables which
is a security concern as they can create/alter/drop/corrupt meta data of any other table without
proper access to the corresponding physical tables.
> [~devaraj] recommended a solution as below.
> 1. A coprocessor endpoint would be implemented and all write accesses to the catalog
table would have to necessarily go through that. The 'hbase' user would own that table. Today,
there is MetaDataEndpointImpl that's run on the RS where the catalog is hosted, and that could
be enhanced to serve the purpose we need.
> 2. The regionserver hosting the catalog table would do the needful for all catalog updates
- creating the mutations as needed, that is.
> 3. The coprocessor endpoint could use Ranger to do necessary authorization checks before
updating the catalog table. So for example, if a user doesn't have authorization to create
a table in a certain namespace, or update the schema, etc., it can reject such requests outright.
Only after successful validations, does it perform the operations (physical operations to
do with creating the table, and updating the catalog table with the necessary mutations).
> 4. In essence, the code that implements dealing with DDLs, would be hosted in the catalog
table endpoint. The client code would be really thin, and it would just invoke the endpoint
with the necessary info. The additional thing that needs to be done in the endpoint is the
validation of authorization to prevent unauthorized users from making changes to someone else's
tables/schemas/etc. For example, one should be able to create a view on a table if he has
read access on the base table. That mutation on the catalog table would be permitted. For
changing the schema (adding a new column for example), the said user would need write permission
on the table... etc etc.
> Thanks [~elserj] for the write-up.



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