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From "Ankit Singhal (JIRA)" <>
Subject [jira] [Commented] (PHOENIX-4198) Remove the need for users to have access to the Phoenix SYSTEM tables to create tables
Date Mon, 18 Sep 2017 14:18:00 GMT


Ankit Singhal commented on PHOENIX-4198:

Thanks [~apurtell],[~elserj],[~tdsilva],[~sergey.soldatov] for the comments.

bq. Make sure to add a JUnit Category annotation to TableDDLPermissionsIT otherwise you'll
run into PHOENIX-4191. Does it make sense to consolidate that test with SystemTablePermissionsIT?
Annotated with a category for now. Yes, we probably can remove SystemTablePermissionsIT now.

bq. mutateRowsWithLocks(...) seems a little weird – when we're doing the new code-path,
we don't explicitly grab any locks whereas I'd assume that does happen in the other codepath.
Is that OK?
Actually, if ACL access is not enabled, we do it with the earlier logic(region.mutateRowsWithLocks)
where region server acquiring read locks again during mutation. Not sure why we had required
this with a single region of the system.catalog table as we were already taking lock before,
does it ensure that all rows are written atomically which Htable.batch will not? are there
any consequences of writing set of mutations with HTable.Batch which is not there in region.mutateRowsWithLocks?

bq. but mandating them is IMHO mandating user lock-in on something external to HBase+Phoenix
for what is a core functional concern (protection of SYSTEM tables)
Yes [~apurtell], as [~elserj] also clear my point that we are not making Phoenix dependent
on any third party component for access control for DDLs operation. The purpose is just to
use the right set of public API so that third-party component can also work automatically
in future along with HBase Native access control if they implement the APIs required for it.

bq. I believe he did some legwork to realize that one of these third-party components didn't
actually implement the full interface, and would thus not actually work. I'll let Ankit confirm,
but I think you are of the same opinion that I am – Ranger (or Sentry) not implementing
the full interface is not our problem and not something we should care about.
yes, Ranger or Sentry will not work until they implement the AccessControlService.Interface#getUserPermissions

bq. Thinking about this more, even if we use this approach to not require that a user has
write access to SYSTEM.SEQUENCE a user can still access any sequence by using SELECT NEXT
VALUE for, so maybe that should be addressed separately.
Yes, We may need to take it in separate JIRA, as we need to treat sequences as another entity
which currently doesn't exist in HBase

bq. Are the changes in MetadataEndpointImpl that use LockManager required because even if
you run as the HBase user calling region.mutateRowsWithLock still uses the original user context
Yes [~tdsilva] that's why we need to create a new RPC using HTable to change the user context.

bq. In there is a new import of net.sf.ehcache.config.TerracottaConfiguration.Consistency.
Is it incorrect IDE autoimport ?
[~sergey soldatov], removed from newer version

> Remove the need for users to have access to the Phoenix SYSTEM tables to create tables
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>                 Key: PHOENIX-4198
>                 URL:
>             Project: Phoenix
>          Issue Type: Bug
>            Reporter: Ankit Singhal
>            Assignee: Ankit Singhal
>              Labels: namespaces
>             Fix For: 4.12.0
>         Attachments: PHOENIX-4198.patch
> Problem statement:-
> A user who doesn't have access to a table should also not be able to modify  Phoenix
Metadata. Currently, every user required to have a write permission to SYSTEM tables which
is a security concern as they can create/alter/drop/corrupt meta data of any other table without
proper access to the corresponding physical tables.
> [~devaraj] recommended a solution as below.
> 1. A coprocessor endpoint would be implemented and all write accesses to the catalog
table would have to necessarily go through that. The 'hbase' user would own that table. Today,
there is MetaDataEndpointImpl that's run on the RS where the catalog is hosted, and that could
be enhanced to serve the purpose we need.
> 2. The regionserver hosting the catalog table would do the needful for all catalog updates
- creating the mutations as needed, that is.
> 3. The coprocessor endpoint could use Ranger to do necessary authorization checks before
updating the catalog table. So for example, if a user doesn't have authorization to create
a table in a certain namespace, or update the schema, etc., it can reject such requests outright.
Only after successful validations, does it perform the operations (physical operations to
do with creating the table, and updating the catalog table with the necessary mutations).
> 4. In essence, the code that implements dealing with DDLs, would be hosted in the catalog
table endpoint. The client code would be really thin, and it would just invoke the endpoint
with the necessary info. The additional thing that needs to be done in the endpoint is the
validation of authorization to prevent unauthorized users from making changes to someone else's
tables/schemas/etc. For example, one should be able to create a view on a table if he has
read access on the base table. That mutation on the catalog table would be permitted. For
changing the schema (adding a new column for example), the said user would need write permission
on the table... etc etc.
> Thanks [~elserj] for the write-up.

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